The world’s third-largest ocean gains prominence in the group as the United States and India converge on priorities to counter rising Chinese influence.
On September 18, 2024, US Deputy Secretary of State and former Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell announced a major regional addition to the United States’ Indo-Pacific priorities – the Indian Ocean.
During a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, Campbell termed the region as “the new frontier” and revealed that the “US, India and others would soon hold a session on the Indian Ocean to talk about what our mutual concerns are, [and] how we can work together.”
Days later on September 21, the leaders of the Quad, an informal grouping of 4 major democracies – the US, Japan, India and Australia met at President Joseph R. Biden’s home in Wilmington, Delaware.
The resulting joint statement, apart from highlighting development-related priorities, focused on strengthening maritime security. The countries agreed on expanding their security footprint in the Indo-Pacific, including the Indian Ocean.
The Quad traces its origins in the Indian Ocean. In the aftermath of a Tsunami in December 2004, all four nations joined hands to coordinate rescue and relief efforts. 20 years on, the group is slowly growing its role in the Indian Ocean – one step at a time.
The latest summit – once again, exemplified the constant balancing between the Quad’s twin goals of development and maritime security. Within the framework, the Indian Ocean is gaining prominence and with the US’ renewed focus on the region – it is likely to receive the priority it deserves.
Indian Ocean Region and the Quad
In its own words, the Quad is a “diplomatic partnership” between Australia, India, Japan and the United States. It is neither a military alliance nor a trading bloc. It is focused on delivering outcomes for the Indo-Pacific as a response to multiple challenges. However, security still remains the “unwritten aim” of the organization where China is at the front and center.
All members of the Quad are major naval powers, committed to a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Their stated regions of operations include the Indian Ocean Region, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean.
At the summit, in addition to introducing new health and development-related programs, the four “maritime democracies” announced a series of measures to strengthen maritime security. The group declared its first-ever Quad-at-Sea Coast Guard mission to improve interoperability and advance maritime safety, without mentioning its area of operation.
It also highlighted the expansion of the Quad’s flagship initiative, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), a technology and training initiative, launched in 2022, to share near real-time information on activities in the Indian and Pacific Ocean with countries in the region. The Quad reported that it has “helped well over two dozen countries” access dark vessel data and monitor activities in their exclusive economic zones.
Within the network, the Information Fusion Centre in Gurugram, India plays an important role in monitoring vessel activities in the Indian Ocean. The Centre hosts International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from 12 countries, including from the other Quad members and Indian Ocean littoral states such as the Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka. The Quad also launched a regional Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI), to train non-members in the Indo-Pacific in monitoring and securing their waters. India is scheduled to hold its first workshop in 2025.
Quad initiatives such as the IPMDA and MAITRI attempt to realize twin objectives of security and development. Though they are security-focused programs but are intrinsically linked to the development goals of island nations in the Indo-Pacific region. These aim to tackle challenges such as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), climate events, and humanitarian crises by sharing real-time information on activities in the maritime zones.
These common concerns transcend national boundaries, and the Quad tries to maintain a balance among its regional priorities. Given the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea and active geopolitical competition with China in the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean region, on occasion, is not the topmost priority. However, China’s growing influence is forcing a strategic rethink, both within the group and individual national strategies.
China’s Influence in the Indian Ocean Region
The Indian Ocean Region is the world’s third largest ocean after the Pacific and Atlantic. It is a vast geographical area that stretches from the eastern coast of Africa to the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia and the Western Coast of Australia, encompassing over 35 countries with a population of almost 3 billion people.
Though the South China Sea and the Pacific remain Beijing’s primary theaters, its activities in the Indian Ocean are steadily rising. Its 2019 National Defense policy included “safeguarding China’s overseas interests” as one of its core aims.
Apart from establishing its first and only overseas military base in Djibouti in the Gulf of Aden in 2017, Beijing has made considerable investments in strategic ports in both South Asia and the western Indian Ocean under its flagship Belt and Road Initiative. Though China denies any military component to its investments, the potential of dual-use cannot be ruled out. In addition to that, China is studying the Indian Ocean through its vast network of survey operations, advancing its understanding of water conditions, currents, and seabed.
India, US Aim to Converge Priorities
China’s activities present a direct challenge to India, which views itself as the primary regional power in the Indian Ocean, with security interests in the immediate neighborhood of South Asia and economic dependence on the western waterways for its international trade.
To narrow the gap with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, the world’s biggest by number of ships, India is investing considerably in its naval forces. Recently, responding to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, India deployed unprecedented naval assets east of the Red Sea and investigated more than 250 commercial ships as part of its anti-piracy operations. This is the clearest sign of India’s bid to emerge as a “net security provider” and an attempt to tilt the balance of power in India’s favor.
While New Delhi has made impressive strides, scarce resources constrain its ambitious strategy. That is where partners like the US come into the picture. The US supports India’s leadership into the region, but its existing strategy presents a hurdle.
Unlike India, which seeks to combine its “Indo” and “Pacific” maritime strategy, the United States is accused of doing the opposite. In its official Indo-Pacific Strategy document of 2022, the Indian Ocean is mentioned just twice. The existing US military command structure also divides the Indian Ocean among 3 combatant commands.
The recent statements by Kurt Campbell indicate that the existing framework is about to change. While pointing out how the Indian Ocean “falls between the cracks,” of the command structure, he revealed that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has asked Admiral Samuel Paparo, the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, to help "fuse together" US military and security approaches.
Other members of the Quad, Japan and Australia, have not committed significant resources, despite publicly accepting the importance of the region.
The upcoming session on Indian Ocean provides an opportunity for the Quad and other stakeholders to coordinate individual policies and finalize an Indian Ocean guiding document. Despite its strategic and economic significance, the Indian Ocean remains a weak link in the long-term geopolitical competition with China. That should change soon.
Nayan Seth is a Fall 2024 Young Professional at the East-West Center in Washington. He is a second-year mid-career master’s student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, with a focus on maritime and energy security in the Indo-Pacific region. Before joining the Fletcher School, he worked as a multimedia journalist in India and China.